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We investigate the impact of institutional quality on individuals using data on the 
financial decisions of immigrants in the U.S. While all of the individuals whose decisions 
we analyze face the same formal institutional framework in the U.S., they bring with 
them their impressions from and experiences with institutions in their home countries.  
We find that immigrants from countries with institutions that more effectively protect 
private property and provide incentives for investment are more likely to participate in 
U.S. financial markets.  The effect of home country institutions is persistent and absorbed 
early in life.  In addition, the impact of institutions is amplified for immigrants who live 
in places where informal institutional constraints are likely to be reinforced, those who 
live in neighborhoods with many other immigrants from the same country of origin.   
These findings are robust to alternative measures of institutional effectiveness and to 
various methods of controlling for unobserved individual characteristics, including 
specifications with country fixed-effects. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Although there is widespread agreement that institutions shape economic outcomes and 
are important determinants of financial market development, we know relatively little 
about what lies inside the institutional “black box”.  What are the channels through which 
institutions provide incentives for investment and influence behavior?  Douglass North 
defines institutions as “formal constraints -- rules that human beings devise” and 
“informal constraints – such as conventions and rules of behavior”.
2  Understanding the 
role of informal institutional constraints is a crucial component of predicting the impact 
of formal institutional change and of making appropriate policy recommendations.  It is 
relatively straight-forward to change formal institutions by altering the written rules that 
govern society, but changing the informal institutional constraints that manifest 
themselves in culture and norms of behavior is much more challenging.
3   
 
This paper focuses on measuring the importance of informal institutional constraints for 
financial development.  Our approach takes advantage of the fact that in any given year, 
vast numbers of individuals confront new institutional surroundings and, in some 
fortuitous cases, detailed data are collected on the financial decisions they make in their 
new institutional environments. More than 175 million people live outside their country 
of birth and about twenty percent of these international migrants live in the U.S. (World 
Migration, 2005).  Together with their skill and talents, international migrants bring 
attitudes and experiences acquired in their country of origin to the destination country.  
North argues that individuals embody the informal institutional constraints reflected in 
their customs, traditions and codes of conduct.
4   
 
In the process of migrating from one country to another, individuals move from one 
formal institutional environment to another but may maintain the informal institutional 
constraints of their country of origin.  International migration allows us to study the 
impact of placing an individual into a different formal institutional environment while 
holding past experience with institutions fixed.  By studying the behavior of international 
migrants in the U.S., we isolate the impact of informal institutional constraints, since all 
of the migrants face the same set of formal rules in the U.S. 
 
By analyzing how financial decisions in the U.S. are influenced by the quality of home 
country institutions, we also gain insights into how the institutional framework becomes 
embedded in individuals and how susceptible it is to change.  For example, we can 
compare the importance of home country institutions for recent migrants relative to 
migrants who have been in the U.S. for many years.  This comparison provides some 
insight into the potential pace of economic progress and financial development following 
institutional reform.   
                                                 
2 “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” (1990), page 4. 
3 For example, Murell (1996), citing North (1990), describes policies in the countries that made up the 
former Soviet Union as a “mélange of the old and the new, a pattern typical of times of great institutional 
change, when revolutions in formal rules move far ahead of modifications in informal arrangements and 
behavior.” 
4 “Economic Institutions Through Time”, Nobel Lecture (1993).  
The bulk of the evidence to date on the importance of institutions for financial 
development comes from cross-country studies which reveal the total impact of 
institutions: formal and informal.  A growing number of studies show that the ability of a 
country’s institutions to protect private property and provide incentives for investment is 
a key explanation for the persistent disparity in financial market development.  These 
studies include Knack and Keefer (1995), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000), Levine 
(1998, 1999), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a, 2003b) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 
and 2002).  Using micro-economic data, Besley (1995) and Johnson, Macmillan and 
Woodruff (2002) show that effective property rights encourage investment.  In addition to 
demonstrating the importance of informal institutional constraints, our paper provides 
independent evidence that institutions which effectively protect private property are a key 
determinant of financial market development.   
 
Glaeser et al. (2004) raise some important issues about how to appropriately measure 
institutional quality.  One advantage of our focus on informal institutional constraints, 
rather than on formal ones, is that it relegates these issues to the sidelines, at least in the 
current context.  From the perspective of an individual, it does not matter whether 
embodied informal constraints are the results of outcomes (a dictator who protects private 
property, for example) or the result of formal constraints (a constitution that prevents a 
government from seizing private property).  The experience and observation of the 
protection of private investment will lead an individual to embody this constraint.  That 
being said, we examine many different measures of institutional effectiveness, including 
protection from expropriation and constraints on the executive and find that our 
conclusions are not driven by the way institutional quality is measured.   
 
Regardless of the institutional quality measure, we find that higher country of origin 
institutional quality is associated with statistically and economically meaningful increases 
in stock market participation.  For example, if Argentina’s institutions increased in 
quality by one standard deviation – that is if its “protection from expropriation” was as 
good as in Germany, then stock market participation among Argentine immigrants in the  
U.S. would increase by 2.8 percentage points, a 29% increase.  A similar increase in 
“constraints on the executive” would increase stock market participation by 1.1 
percentage points, a 12% increase.   
 
Our approach is similar to that of Fernandez and Fogli (2005) who show that country of 
ancestry fertility and female labor force characteristics influence the fertility and work 
behavior of U.S.-born children of immigrants.
5  One important difference between their 
work and ours is that we study the behavior of immigrants, not their children.  Because 
we study the behavior of individuals who have chosen to migrate to the U.S., we have to 
                                                 
5 Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) also use a conceptually similar approach in their study of the cultural 
determinants of savings.  Hendricks (2004) examines the behavior of immigrants in the U.S. to explain 
variation in hours worked across countries.  For hours worked in the U.S. he finds that home country 
characteristics are important for women but not for men.  Borjas (1987) also looks at the impact of country 
of origin characteristics on immigrant wage assimilation. take seriously the concern that the migration decision is influenced by the home country 
institutional environment in a way that is manifested in unobservable individual 
characteristics.  
 
We take a number of steps to ensure that our findings are robust to potential biases due to 
the correlation of country of origin institutional quality and unobserved individual 
characteristics.  First, we show that our findings are robust to controlling for immigrant 
selection that is related to country of origin inequality as described in Borjas (1987).  
Second, and more definitively, we eliminate the possibility that unobserved individual 
attributes are correlated with country of origin institutional quality by including country 
fixed effects in a specification where institutional quality is interacted with “ethnic 
concentration”, a country and city specific measure of the size of an immigrant network.  
These results indicate that coming from a country with German rather than Argentinean 
institutions would increase stock market participation by 0.9 percentage points for the 
median immigrant, a 10 percent increase.   
 
The finding that institutional quality matters more for immigrants who cluster together in 
neighborhoods with other immigrants from the same country addresses a substantive as 
well as an econometric issue.  The third component of the institutional environment, 
according to North, is the “enforcement characteristics” of formal and informal 
institutional constraints.
6  We find that informal institutional constraints matter more 
when they are likely to be enforced and reinforced through immigrant networks.    
 
We find that institutional quality has the largest impact on investment decisions which 
require the most institutional support.  Institutional quality matters more for stock market 
participation than for owning a savings or a checking account, for example.  It also 
matters more for stock market participation than for investments in health or human 
capital that are mediated largely through the family rather than through formal 
institutions.  The fact that institutional quality matters when it should and does not matter 
when it should not makes it unlikely that the findings are due to unobserved country of 
origin characteristics. 
 
In an effort to better understand the mechanism through which country of origin 
institutions work, we investigate how the impact of home country institutions varies with 
length of time in the U.S., with age at migration and with education.  Home country 
institutional effects are very long-lasting, affecting all immigrants, except those who have 
lived in the U.S. for more than 28 years.  The decisions of all immigrants who arrive in 
the U.S. at age 16 or later are influenced by institutions.  Only immigrants who arrive in 
the U.S. as young children are not influenced by country of origin institutions.  The fact 
that immigrants who leave their birth countries when they are 16 to 20 years old, and not  
yet adults, suggests that individuals absorb some lessons about institutions in the family 
and at school, rather then through direct experience. 
 
We find that the impact of institutions increases with education.  This contrasts with the 
findings of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004 and 2005), who find that the effects of 
                                                 
6 “Economic Institutions Through Time”, Nobel Lecture (1993). social capital and culture, are smaller for those with greater education.
7  This hints at a 
potentially important distinction between how some aspects of culture and informal 
institutional constraints influence behavior.  Educated individuals in a country may have 
more direct experience with their country’s institutions compared to the less-educated.  
They clearly have more direct experience with educational institutions.  Individuals with 
more schooling may be more likely to participate in other home country institutions as 
well.  These educational “elites” may also belong to a relatively small minority whose 
property is protected by institutions that are more generally ineffectual.
8   
 
We explore the distinction between culture and informal institutional constraints in more 
detail by examining the impact of country of ancestry institutions on individuals who 
were born in the U.S.  For those who were born in the U.S., institutional quality has no 
effect on stock market participation, suggesting that the norms and rules of behavior that 
make up informal institutional constraints are distinct from other components of culture 
that persist across generations.   
 
The next section describes the framework we use to derive the predicted relationship 
between institutional quality and financial market decisions.  In section 3, we describe the 
country and individual level data that we analyze.  Section 4 outlines the empirical 
strategy, discusses our findings and their robustness.  Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Framework 
 
It is helpful to sketch out a simple reduced form framework in order to make the 
hypotheses that we test clear.  While we illustrate the framework in terms of an 
individual’s decision about how much stock to purchase, this framework could easily 
apply to other financial decisions as well.  Consider an individual, i, from country J who 
is considering how much stock to purchase.  The individual’s demand for stock is 
represented by: 
) , ( i i X ER f S =  
where Si is the amount that individual i invests in stock, ER is the expected return from 
the investment, and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (risk aversion, income, 
education, years in the U.S., age at migration, and so on) that affect the demand for stock.   
 
Institutional quality is modeled by assuming that the investor believes there is some 
probability, πi that the stock broker will abscond with the investor’s funds.  This variable 
captures the investor’s beliefs about the likelihood of expropriation by firm managers or 
by the government.  It measures, not only the possibility that the stock broker will 
abscond with funds, but also the possibility that the institutional framework is not 
                                                 
7 In contrast, Glaeser et al (2001) find that individuals who invest in human capital also tend to have higher 
levels of social capital.   
8 See, for example, the discussion in Bates (1981) of government policies in Nigeria and in Ghana that 
benefited elites at the expense of other less politically influential groups.  Similarly, the politicization of 
economic activity under Suharto in Indonesia clearly benefited Suharto and those with connections to him 
(see Temple in Rodrik (2003)). sufficient to ensure that funds will be invested in profit maximizing projects, that 
investment proceeds will be appropriately reinvested or returned to investors.  We 
assume that brokers are governed by the same institutional framework and therefore they 
face a common cost of absconding.  This means that broker variation in the likelihood of 
absconding can be safely ignored. 
 
Given her beliefs, the investor’s expected return on the investment will not be R, the 
expected return on the stock, but πi x 0 + (1 – πi) x R.  The probability that an investor 
places on the likelihood that the stock broker absconds is a function of the quality of the 
institutions in the country that investor was born in, J, which may in turn be a function of 
the length of time the investor experienced those institutions, yJ, and the length exposure 
that the investor has to U.S. institutions, yUS: πi = π(J, yJ, yUS).  
 
For the typical immigrant who comes from a country where institutions are weaker than 
in the U.S., π is decreasing in origin country institutional quality, increasing in years 
spent in the origin country, and decreasing in years spent in the U.S.
9  Given this 
framework, demand for stock will be increasing in home country institutional quality and 
for a given level of institutional quality, π will be higher for individuals who have 
recently arrived in the U.S. and who have arrived as adults. 
 
We can also use this framework to think about how the effect of institutional quality will 
vary depending on the type of investment.  The level of confidence in institutions 
required to make an investment vehicle reasonable depends on how institutionally 
intensive it is.  Investing in stock, for example, requires a great deal of confidence in 
many institutions.  The investor must be convinced that the stock broker will not abscond 
with her investment and that the institutional and legal framework is sufficient to ensure 
that funds will be invested in profitable profits and that the proceeds of these projects will 
be returned to investors and not be expropriated by management, either in the form of 
non-productive investment or through outright theft.  Investing in savings, opening a 
savings account, on the other hand, requires relatively less confidence in institutions and 
confidence primarily in a single institution, a bank.  An investor must be convinced that 
the bank will keep her funds safe, accurately pay any interest due and return accumulated 
funds upon demand.   
 
For a given home country institutional background, an individual is likely to put more 
weight on the possibility that an investment in stock will be stolen compared to the 
possibility that money invested in a savings account will disappear.  This means that πStock 
is greater than πSavings and that the effect of home country institutions should be greater 
for stock than for savings and other “safer” investments.   
 
Other investments, say in children’s health or education, which are primarily mediated 
through the family, require even less confidence in U.S. institutions.  For investments that 
require no institutional support – that are entirely mediated through the family – 
institutions should not matter, πFamily should be close to zero. 
                                                 
9 Note that regardless of how we measure institutional effectiveness, institutional quality in the U.S. is 
equal to ten, the maximum possible value.  
 
3.  Data 
 
Individual data 
The challenge in using individual data is to find meaningful variation in institutional 
quality within a single data set.  We achieve this by looking at a large sample of 
individuals living in the U.S.  Historically high rates of migration to the U.S. in the past 
two decades mean that at least 10 percent of the U.S. population was born abroad.  The 
1996 – 2000 Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data that we use are 
designed to be representative of the U.S. population and include approximately 46,000 
individuals, of whom 11% are immigrants.  These individuals face a common set of 
formal institutional constraints in the U.S., but the immigrants vary in the institutional 
constraints that they have experienced prior to coming to the U.S. 
 
We restrict the sample to immigrants who are over 18 and live in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), for a total sample of 15,043 observations, with (approximately) 4 
annual observations per person.
10  Table 2A summarizes these data for immigrants and 
the native-born. Compared to the native-born, immigrants are younger, more likely to be 
married, non-white, have more children and more likely to be unemployed our 
economically inactive.  Immigrants also tend to be less educated than the native born.  
Slightly less than 36% of the immigrant sample has never completed high school 
compared to only 15% of the native-born sample.  However, the percentage of 
immigrants and the native-born who have an advanced degree is roughly the same at 7% 
and 8%, respectively.   
 
Monthly per capita household income is significantly lower for immigrants compared to 
the native-born.  For immigrants, average monthly per capita household income is 
$1,640, compared to $2,224 for the native-born.  In addition to having lower incomes, 
immigrant households have also accumulated less wealth compared to households headed 
by individuals who were born in the U.S.  The median immigrant household has wealth 
of $29,001 compared to $71,123 for the native born. 
 
Stock market participation is the logical individual-level counterpart to country-level 
stock market capitalization, which is the measure of financial market development used 
in many cross-country level studies of institutions and financial market development.  
Eight and a half percent of the immigrant sample owns stock, compared with 20% of the 
native-born.  Forty-seven percent of immigrants have a checking account compared with 
64% of the native-born.  Savings account ownership has a similar pattern.  Forty percent 
of the immigrant sample has a savings account, compared with 55% of the native-born. 
 
Additional immigrant characteristics are described in Table 2B.  Nearly one-half of the 
immigrants arrived in the U.S. within the 10 prior to the start of the survey. Just under 
half of the immigrants were born in a North American country and about 15% were born 
                                                 
10 We restrict our attention to the four annual survey waves where wealth data are available.  Other SIPP 
variables are collected quarterly.   in Europe.  Most of the immigrants arrived in the U.S. as adults, with almost 71% 
arriving at twenty-one years or older.  
 
Country data 
The individual data are augmented with country level data compiled from various 
sources.  These data include various measures of institutional quality, and other important 
country characteristics.  Table 1 defines each variable and describes its source.     
 
Measures of Institutional Quality 
What are “good” institutions?  Adam Smith powerfully captures some of the most 
important components of effective institutions in The Wealth of Nations: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of 
contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not 
supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payments of debts from those 
who are able to pay.  Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish 
in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of 
government. 
Transforming this image of effective institutions into a number that can be used in 
empirical analysis is a challenge.  The literature emphasizes a number of different ways 
to operationalize what is meant by institutional effectiveness, including: “protection from 
expropriation”, “constraints on the executive”, “rule of law” and legal origin.  The 
various institutional measures have conceptual strengths and weaknesses as well as 
strengths and weaknesses related to the number of countries that they cover and the time 
period that they are available for.   
 
Our approach is to look at a number of different measures of institutional quality in an 
effort to ensure that the results do not depend on the specific way that institutional 
effectiveness is transformed into a number.  In this section we describe the various 
measures of institutional quality (and its determinants) that we use.  The institutional 
quality measures are summarized in Table 3A and their correlations are reported in Table 
3B.  A discussion of the advantages of particular measures and how they have been used 
in the literature is included with the presentation of the results in the next section.    
 
We use two measures of institutional quality from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) IRIS-3 data.  These measures are “protection from expropriation of private 
investment” and “rule of law”.  “Protection from expropriation” evaluates the risk 
“outright confiscation and forced nationalization” of property.  Lower ratings “are given 
to countries where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event.”   The 
“rule of  law” variable “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing 
to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes.”  Higher scores indicate:  “sound political institutions, a strong court system, 
and provisions for an orderly succession of power.”  Lower scores indicate: “a tradition 
of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims.”  These institutional quality measures are formed from averages of annual observations from 1982 to 1995 
and are rescaled, if necessary so that the maximum possible value is ten. 
 
A third measure of institutional quality focuses is drawn from the Polity IV Database and 
focuses specifically on limitations to executive power.  “Constraints on the executive” 
measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the power of the chief executive.  
This institutional quality measure is also formed from averages of annual observations 
from 1982 to 1995 and has been rescaled so that the maximum possible value is ten. 
 
In addition to “rule of law,” we also use each country’s legal tradition as a measure of 
institutional quality.  “British legal origin” is equal to one it the country has a British 
legal tradition and is zero otherwise. 
 
In addition to these four measures, which have been used extensively in the literature, we 
create a new measure, “domestic protection from expropriation of private investment”.  
This measure is specifically designed to capture investment conditions from the 
perspective of domestic, rather than foreign, entrepreneurs.  This variable is created from 
country level surveys of local entrepreneurs.  These surveys were completed in August 
1996 – February 1997 as part of a World Bank project and are discussed in the 1997 
World Development Report.  We use responses to questions about the impact of theft and 
crime on the cost of business, the ability of state authorities to protect person and 
property and the impact of the predictability of the judiciary on business operations to 
create an index for each country.  Respondents were asked to rank current conditions and 
conditions 10 years ago.  The current and historical responses to each of the three 
questions were averaged and then an overall average was formed. One drawback of this 
measure is that it is only available for 31 countries.
11     
 
In addition direct measures of institutional quality, we look at two potential determinants 
of institutional quality: geography and human capital.  Geographic endowments are 
proxied by the absolute value of the latitude of the country’s capital, and human capital is 
measured by the average years of schooling among adults in the country in 1960.   
 
The institutional quality measures are available for 79 countries (including the U.S.), with 
three exceptions.  “Constraints on the executive” is available for 76 countries, “Domestic 
Protection from Expropriation” is available for 31 countries, and average schooling in 
1960 is available for 61 countries.  The various measures and their relationship to the 
literature are discussed in more detail in the following section.   
 
Table 3A presents some summary statistics for each of the country-level variables that we 
use.  U.S. values for each variable are reported in the column on the far right of the table. 
Institutional quality ranges, as measured by protection from expropriation, ranges from 
1.83 (Iraq) to 10.00 (the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.S.).  The average is 7.50.   
“Constraints on the executive” has similar properties.  It ranges from 1.43 (Cuba, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria) to 10.00 (including the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.S.), and its 
                                                 
11 Because we do not look separately at the transition countries, we are able to use data from just 31of the 
67 country surveys that were completed. mean is 6.96.  There are some important distinctions between these the measures of 
institutional quality, however.  For example, Mexico and China both have above average 
protection from expropriation but below average executive constraints.   
 
That being said, the various measures of institutional quality tend to be highly correlated 
with one another (see Table 3B).  For example, the correlation coefficient between 
“protection from expropriation” and “constraints on the executive” is 0.62.  One 
exception to this pattern is British legal origin.  This variable is not significantly 
correlated with “protection from expropriation” or “constraints on the executive”.   
However, it is negatively correlated with latitude.  “Domestic protection from 
expropriation” is positively correlated with its international counterpart, suggesting that 
in most cases a country’s institutional climate is similar for domestic and foreign 
investors.  “Domestic protection from expropriation” is not significantly correlated with 
“constraints on the executive” and “British legal origin”.  However, it is positively related 
to both latitude and average years of schooling in 1960. 
 
Other country variables  
In addition to measures of institutional quality, important country-level explanatory 
variables include:  whether people from the country can speak English (from Bleakley 
and Chin, 2004); income, as measured by the average real per capita GDP from 1982 to 
1995; financial development, measured as the average stock market capitalization from 
1982 to 1995; inequality, measured by the average of all high quality Gini coefficient 
observations from 1985 to 1995 from Deininger and Squire (1996); and religion.  These 
variables are also described in Table 1 and summarized in Table 3A. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
This section reports on our empirical findings.  We estimate the decision to participate in 
the stock market using the following linear probability model: 
 
Sisj = α + β1Xi + β2Zj + δs + εisj, 
 
Where  Sisj  is the decision to own stock for individual i who lives in metropolitan 
statistical area s and comes from country j.  Individual controls are incorporated in Xi and 
include age, age squared, wealth quartiles, income, labor force status, education, sex, 
marital status, number of children in household, and race.  A full set of MSA controls are 
included in δs, and Zj measures institutional quality in country j.  All of the reported 
standard errors have been corrected to account for the heteroscedasticity that is implicit in 
the linear probability model and are also adjusted to allow for correlation across 
observations for immigrants who come from the same country.
12      
 
Baseline Findings and Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality 
                                                 
12 We use a linear probability model because it works well with fixed effects, is consistent under weak 
assumptions and because the coefficient estimates are easy to interpret.  In particular, the coefficients on 
interaction terms are straight-forward to interpret (see Ai and Norton, 2003).  Non-linear estimation 
methods, such as probit or logit, generate similar results. The relationship between stock market participation and institutional quality is explored 
in Table 4 for a variety of measures of institutional effectiveness.  In addition we also 
examine the relationship between stock market participation and some potential 
determinants of institutional quality: country of origin geographical attributes and 
country-level human capital.  The sample is restricted to immigrants who are at least 18 
years of age, live in a MSA and come from one of the 78 countries for which institutional 
quality data are available.  In addition to a measure of institutional quality, human capital 
or geography, the explanatory variables include age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor 
force status, income, marital status, sex, race, education, number of children and controls 
for the MSA where the immigrant lives.
13    
 
We find that institutional quality has a positive and significant effect on stock market 
participation.  According to these estimates, if an individual from a country with 
“average” institutions, as captured by “protection from expropriation” had instead come 
from a country that had institutions that were one standard deviation above the mean, the 
likelihood that they owned stock would increase by 2.8 percentage points, a 32% increase 
in the likelihood of stock market participation, relative to the observed participation rate 
for immigrants of 8.6%.  This is roughly equivalent to considering what would happen if 
Argentina’s “protection from expropriation” had been the same as Germany’s between 
1982 and 1995.  The results are the same if we use “rule of law” to measure institutional 
quality.
14   
 
One attractive feature of the “protection from expropriation” measure of institutional 
quality is that improvements in “protection from expropriation” are correlated with future 
equity returns (Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996)).  Changes in “rule of law” and other 
ICRG-IRIS-3 data are not correlated with future equity returns. 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that “constraints on the executive” is a more appropriate way 
to capture North’s description of institutions as constraints.  An important issue that they 
raise is that measures like “protection for expropriation” measure outcomes rather than 
constraints.  From the point of view of an individual, rather than a country, this 
distinction is less relevant.  The informal institutional constraints that an individual 
comes to embody could be the result of formal institutional constraints or of outcomes.  
Our findings support this view, since we find largely the same results regardless of 
whether we use “constraints on the executive” or other measures of institutional 
effectiveness.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in constraints on the 
executive is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in stock market participation.   
 
Another concern with the “protection from expropriation” and the “rule of law” measures 
is that they are specifically designed to capture conditions from the perspective of private, 
foreign investors.  To address this concern, we use “domestic protection from 
expropriation”, which is based surveys of domestic investors, to measure institutional 
                                                 
13 See Appendix Table 2 for the impact of these independent variables. 
14 The results are also the same if we use the ICRG measure “quality of the bureaucracy”.  This variable is 
highly correlated with “protection from expropriation”. quality.  When we use this measure of institutional quality, we continue to find a strong 
positive relationship between institutional quality and stock market participation.   
 
La Porta et al. (1998 and 2000) show that greater protection is offered to shareholders in 
countries with a British legal tradition and that financial development is accelerated in 
these countries.  Our findings parallel theirs: stock market participation among 
immigrants from countries with a British legal tradition is 3.3 percentage points higher 
than that of immigrants from countries with a different legal tradition.
15  
 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), Bloom and Sachs (1998), and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) find that geography has an important effect on the quality 
of institutions.  Countries that are further from the equator tend to develop stronger 
institutions.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that European colonialists 
adopted different colonization policies depending on the host country environment, 
leading to more effective institutional arrangements in some countries.  Although their 
work emphasizes the role of settler mortality rates in determining the colonization policy, 
they also show that places where effective institutional arrangements were established 
tend to be further from the equator.   In addition, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2002) show that latitude helps to explain financial development.  We use the absolute 
value of the latitude of the capital city divided by 90 to capture this effect and find that 
individuals who were born in countries that are further from the equator are significantly 
more likely to participate in the U.S. stock market.   
 
Some authors argue and provide evidence that the ability of a country to acquire good 
institutions is determined by the availability of human capital (see Barro (1999) and 
Glaeser et al. (2004), for example).  We examine this possibility in the final column of 
Table 4 where we examine the impact of average years of schooling in 1960 in the 
country of origin on stock market participation in the U.S.
16  Immigrants from countries 
with greater human capital in 1960 are more likely to own stock in the U.S.  A one 
standard deviation increase (two and a half years) in average years of schooling in 1960, 
is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in stock market participation in the U.S. 
 
These baseline findings suggest that immigrants come to the U.S. with attitudes shaped 
by the effectiveness of home country institutions, regardless of how they are measured, 
and that the ability of home country institutions to protect investment and provide 
incentives for investment has a significant effect on immigrant behavior in the U.S.  For 
ease of exposition, the rest of the paper uses a single measure of institutional quality, 
“protection from expropriation”. 
 
Additional Country Controls 
                                                 
15 Some studies find that the degree of ethnic tensions in a country is an important predictor of institutional 
quality, since the greater ethnic diversity may lead to the adoption of policies that favor expropriation of 
resources, rather than the emergence of open and competitive systems (Easterly and Levine, 2002).  We 
find no significant relationship between country of origin ethnic concentration and stock market 
participation among immigrants in the U.S.  
16 The smaller sample size for this estimate is due to the lack of data on schooling in 1960 for Mexico. We turn our attention now to exploring the robustness of our findings.  The first issue we 
consider is that there may be other important country of origin characteristics that are 
correlated with institutional quality that were left out of the baseline results.  For 
example, perhaps it is not institutional quality that matters, but income in the country of 
origin.  We may have found a significantly positive effect of institutional quality on 
financial market participation because institutional quality is positively correlated with 
country income and country income was not included in the baseline estimates.  We 
explore the possibility that our findings are the result of omitted country characteristics in 
Table 5.  In addition to the explanatory variables reported on in Table 5, each of these 
estimates includes all of the same control variables that were included in the baseline 
estimates.  
 
For purposes of comparison, the first column of Table 5 repeats the results from Table 4 
column [1].  In column [2], we report on estimates that include continent controls in 
addition to protection from expropriation.  One possible explanation for our findings is 
that there is discrimination against individuals based on their continent of origin, say 
Africa or Central or South America, for example, and that countries in the same continent 
tend to share institutional qualities.
17  This leaves open the possibility that the protection 
from expropriation risk variable is measuring the effect of discrimination rather than 
institutional quality.  In order to explore the feasibility of this potential explanation, we 
add a set of continent controls to the estimates.  Adding continent controls leaves the 
coefficient on protection from expropriation positive and significant.   
 
We also examine the possibility that religious influences on institutional quality are 
responsible for our earlier findings in column [3] of Table 5.  Stulz and Williamson 
(2003), for example, document a link between a country’s religious attributes and 
investor rights, particularly creditor rights.  This estimate adds controls for the percentage 
of the country of origin population that is Catholic, Protestant and Muslim to the baseline 
specification.  Adding these variables lowers the point estimate of the impact of 
institutional quality from 0.016 to 0.011.    
 
Another potential explanation for our findings is that financial market adaptation may be 
easier for immigrants from countries that are more similar to the U.S.  This would mean 
that the positive coefficient on protection from expropriation should be interpreted to 
mean that individuals from countries with institutions like the U.S. are more likely to 
participate in U.S. financial markets, rather than as an indication that better institutions to 
protect private property encourage financial market participation.  If this is the case, then 
including other, potentially better, measures of the similarity between the country of 
origin economy and the U.S. should eliminate the significance of “protection from 
expropriation”.  In order to capture this possibility, we include average per capita GDP 
from 1982 to 1995 in the country of origin in the estimate presented in column [4] of 
Table 5.  Countries with better institutions have higher GDP per capita (see Rodrik, 
Subramainan and Trebbi (2004), for example), so including this variable may absorb 
some of the effect of institutional quality.  GDP per capita has a positive but insignificant 
                                                 
17 Recall that the estimates include a control for being “non-white”, so the continent controls capture 
differential treatment based on continent of origin, holding racial characteristics fixed. effect on stock market participation.
18  Adding this variable reduces the coefficient on 
“protection from expropriation” from 0.016 to 0.013.   
 
Since countries with high institutional quality also tend to have been colonized by 
Britain, it is possible that the positive coefficient on protection from expropriation is 
capturing not institutional quality, but the ability of individuals who were born in some 
former British colonies to speak English.  The ability or inability to speak English may 
play an important role in determining the ease if participating in the stock market 
participation.
19  Ideally, we would include an individual measure of English speaking 
ability in the estimates.  However, the SIPP data does not include any measure of this 
characteristic, so we try to capture it at the country level instead.  Column [5] in Table 5 
adds an indicator variable that is equal to one if the country of origin has English as an 
official language of the country and  if a majority of immigrants from that country 
surveyed in the 1980 U.S. Census spoke English at home (see Bleakley and Chin, 2004). 
Coming from a country where English is spoken has a positive, and statistically 
insignificant effect on the likelihood of owning stock.  Adding this variable to the 
estimates lowers the point estimate of the coefficient on institutional quality somewhat 
(from 0.013 to 0.011).  However, it remains positive and significant.   
 
The availability and sophistication of home country financial markets may also influence 
the likelihood of stock market participation among immigrants in the U.S.
 20  Immigrants 
from countries where the stock market is relatively small, for example, may simply be 
unfamiliar with this type of investment.  Ideally, we would control for past usage of the 
stock market at the individual level.  However, those data are unavailable.  In column [6] 
of Table 5, we add average stock market capitalization in the country of origin from 1982 
to 1995 and its square to the regression.  Home country stock market capitalization has a 
positive but insignificant effect on stock market participation.  The coefficient on 
institutional quality in this regression is highly significant and equal to 0.017.  Note that 
stock market capitalization in the country of origin is also determined to some extent by 
the quality of country of origin institutions.
21     
 
Overall the results presented in Table 5 suggest that the finding that the decision to own 
stock in the U.S. is influenced by the quality of institutions in the country of origin is 
robust to including additional attributes of the country of origin.  
 
                                                 
18 Many studies, including Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), Easterly 
and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramainian and Trebbi (2004) find that GDP per capita is higher in 
countries with better institutions.  
19 Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1987) show that immigrants from English speaking countries experience 
more rapid wage assimilation. 
20 We have also examined the effect of controlling for remittances to the home country.  If immigrants are 
not investing in U.S. financial markets perhaps they are investing at home through remittances.  Including a 
measure of remittances received in the home country does not alter the effect of institutional quality.  We 
find that migrants from countries that receive higher per capita remittances are more likely to participate in 
U.S. stock markets. 
21 Using “contract intensive money” as a measure of financial market development leads to the same 
findings.  Contract intensive money is equal to the non-cash fraction of the money supply and is associated 
with higher rates of investment and growth.  See Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1999).  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
We turn our attention now to what is an important empirical issue for any study of 
immigrant behavior and for ours in particular.  Immigrants are not random 
representatives of their country of origin.  They choose to migrate and that decision may 
be influenced by characteristics that are not observable.  If unobserved individual 
characteristics are correlated with country of origin institutional quality, then we need to 
be concerned that our findings capture the effect of unobserved individual characteristics, 
rather than the effect of institutional quality.  We take a number of steps to ensure that 
this is not the case. 
 
Self-selection and home country inequality 
According to Borjas (1987), the decision to migrate will be a function of, among other 
things, unobserved migrant ability and the distribution of income in the country of origin 
and the destination country.  Because they are only concerned with the right tail of the 
income distribution, high ability migrants will tend to migrate from more equal societies 
to less equal ones.   In contrast, low ability migrants will move from less equal societies 
to more equal ones, to protect themselves against a draw from the low end of the wage 
distribution.  Since countries with low inequality also tend to have strong institutions, we 
have to be concerned that our finding that financial market participation increases with 
country of origin institutional quality is driven by ability bias.
22  For example, high ability 
individuals from countries with low inequality and high quality institutions are more 
likely to migrate and low ability individuals from countries with high inequality and less 
effective institutions tend to migrate.  We address this by adding a measure of country of 
origin inequality, the Gini coefficient, to the baseline estimates.   
 
These results are found in Table 6.  Because Gini coefficient data are only available for a 
subset of countries, these estimates use a smaller sample.  The first column in Table 6 
reports the baseline findings for the smaller sample.  The second column adds the country 
of origin Gini coefficient.  Greater inequality in the country of origin is associated with 
lower financial market participation in the U.S. We find some evidence that selective 
immigration of the sort described above may bias the baseline estimates of the coefficient 
on institutional quality.  Adding the Gini coefficient to the estimation reduces the 
coefficient on “protection from expropriation” from 0.024 to 0.013.  The impact of 
having German rather than Argentinean institutions is estimated to be a 2.3 percentage 
point increase in stock market participation, rather than a 4.2 percentage point increase.   
 
Ethnic concentration and country of origin fixed effects 
In addition to unobserved ability, there are other individual characteristics that we cannot 
observe that may have an important role in the decision to participate in financial markets 
and may also be correlated with country of origin institutional quality.  For example, the 
degree of risk aversion may be correlated with the likelihood of migration from particular 
countries and also influences the decision to own stock.  Similarly, variation in 
educational quality across countries may impact the cost of obtaining information about 
                                                 
22 Engerman and Sokoloff  (2000) provide evidence that in societies with high initial inequality the 
evolution of institutions favored a narrow elite. U.S. financial markets.  Parental participation in financial markets is likely to be 
correlated with country of origin institutional quality and with the decision to own stock 
of the current generation (Chiteji and Stafford (2000)).   
 
In order to produce unbiased estimates of the effect of country of origin institutional 
quality on financial market participation in the U.S., we need to eliminate the possibility 
that omitted individual characteristics are correlated with country of origin institutional 
quality.  If we can do this, we can confidently interpret the coefficient estimate on 
institutional quality, despite the fact that there may be important individual characteristics 
that we do not observe.   
 
To do this, we create a new measure of institutional quality that captures both 
institutional quality and the potential size of an immigrant network.  The new measure of 
institutional quality is the interaction of “protection from expropriation” with “ethnic 
concentration.  Ethnic concentration is defined as the percentage of people in an MSA 
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=  
 
See Appendix Table 1 for the median ethnic concentration for immigrants from each 
country.  We use data from the 1990 Census IPUMS to calculate this measure for each 
country of origin and MSA.   
 
In Table 7, we estimate: 
 
Sisj = α + β1Xi + β2ZjxECsj + β3ECsj  + δs + δj + εisj, 
 
where ZjxECsj is the interaction of institutional quality and ethnic concentration for an 
individual from country j who lives in MSA s.  We include a full set of country of origin 
controls in δj.  All of the other variables are defined above. 
 
Because this new institutional quality measure varies by country of origin for a given 
MSA, we can include both country and MSA fixed effects in the estimation.  By 
including country of origin fixed effects, we eliminate correlation between unobserved 
individual attributes and country of origin.  
 
By including MSA fixed effects in all of the estimates, we rule out another potential 
source of bias in the new institutional quality measure.  Since location choice is non-
random, immigrants who choose to live in an MSA with a large fraction of immigrants 
from the same country of origin are likely to be systematically different along 
unobservable dimensions from immigrants who choose to live in an MSA with very few 
immigrants from the same country of origin.   By including MSA fixed effects, we ensure 
that the coefficient on protection from expropriation interacted with ethnic concentration 
will be unbiased. 
 In addition to dealing with a potential source of bias, this approach may also shed light on 
why the quality of country of origin institutions matters for financial market participation.  
A significant and positive coefficient on the new institutional quality measure means that 
the impact of coming from a country with weak institutions is reinforced when 
individuals from countries with weak institutions live near one another.  
 
These estimates are reported in Table 7.  The first column reports estimates of stock 
market participation using “protection from expropriation” multiplied by “ethnic 
concentration” to measure institutional quality.  This estimate also includes the direct 
effect of ethnic concentration.   The estimates presented in column [1] do not include 
country fixed effects.  Column [2] adds country fixed effects.  Columns [1] and [2] use 
the entire sample of 77 countries.  Columns [3] and [4] repeat this exercise for the 29 
countries in the sample with more than 100 observations per country.  The number of 
observations for each country is relevant here because we estimate country of origin fixed 
effects. 
 
The coefficient on institutional quality interacted with ethnic concentration remains 
positive and significant when country fixed effects are included.  The point estimate is 
lowest in column [4] when country fixed effects are included and when the sample is 
restricted to the 29 countries with more than 100 observations, so we will discuss those 
findings.  For the median immigrant who lives in a city where 0.78 percent of the 
population comes from the same country, the estimates imply that the likelihood of 
owning stock would increase by 0.9 percentage points if institutional quality had been 
one standard deviation higher from 1982 to 1995.  By comparison, the baseline findings, 
which are not corrected for unobserved heterogeneity, imply that the same increase in 
institutional quality is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in stock market 
participation.    
 
Enforcement of Informal Institutional Constraints 
In addition to addressing an important econometric issue, the estimates which include 
institutional quality interacted with ethnic concentration speak to an important 
substantive one.  North (1993) defines institutions as a trinity: the formal rules of the 
game, informal institutional constraints and the enforcement of formal and informal 
constraints.  One role of neighborhoods with a large population of immigrants from a 
single country is the enforcement of country of origin norms and customs (see for 
example Kandori (1992)).  When immigrants live in a place where country of origin 
institutional constraints are more likely to be enforced, these constraints should matter 
more.   
 
We find evidence in favor of this view.  Ethnic concentration is roughly twice that of the 
median immigrant for Filipino immigrants and about one-half of the median for 
Portuguese immigrants.  A one standard deviation improvement in institutions in the 
Philippines is predicted to increase Filipino stock market participation by 2.1 percentage 
points.  The same improvement in institutional quality would increase stock market 
participation by 0.43 percentage points for Portuguese immigrants. 
 The finding that the effect of institutional quality varies with size of the potential 
immigrant network is consistent with work by Madrian and Shea (2000), Duflo and Saez 
(2003) and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) who show that social interactions have 
important effects on financial decisions.   Immigrant networks have also been show to be 
important in a number of other non-financial contexts, including employment 
probabilities (Munshi, 2003), wage growth and human capital accumulation (Boras, 1995 
and 2000) and language proficiency (Chiswick and Miller, 1996).  Fernandez and Fogli 
(2005) show that the impact of country of ancestry norms on fertility and women’s labor 
force participation is also amplified for the children of immigrants who reside in 
neighborhoods with other people who share the same country of ancestry.    
 
The effect of institutional quality on other behavior 
We continue our exploration of the robustness of the link between stock market 
participation and institutional quality by considering the effect of institutional quality on 
other behavior.  In Table 8 we present estimates of the effect of country of origin 
institutional quality on the decision to have a checking account, a savings account, to 
invest in children’s health via prescription drugs, to drive one’s own car to work, and to 
visit a doctor.  These estimates serve two purposes.  First, they allow us to test the 
hypothesis that the importance of institutional quality declines with the level of 
institutional support required to make a particular investment decision reasonable.   
Second, these estimates address the possibility that institutional quality is proxying for 
some other country of origin characteristic – national character, for example -- that 
explains all sorts of behavior, not just behavior that should be governed by the 
institutions that determine protection of private property and incentives for investment.  
In other words, the regressions in Table 8 tell us if institutions matter when they are 
supposed to and do not matter when they should not. 
 
The first panel of Table 8 uses the baseline specification and the second panel controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity using the specification from Table 7, which interacts 
protection from expropriation with ethnic concentration and includes country of origin 
fixed effects.  For ease of comparison column [1] repeats the regressions from Table 4, 
column [1] and Table 7, column [2].   
 
Looking first at the decision to open a savings account, we see that in the baseline 
specification higher institutional quality is associated with a higher likelihood of having a 
savings account.  A one standard deviation increase in institutional quality is associated 
with a 3.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having a savings account, a 9.5 
percent increase in the likelihood of having a savings account relative to the observed 
percentage of immigrants with a savings account of 40.1%.  The same increase in 
institutional quality is predicted to increase stock market participation by 29 percent.  In 
addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that the savings account results are due to 
biases induced by unobserved heterogeneity.  As we expect from the relative importance 
of institutional support required by the two investments, institutional quality has a larger 
impact on the likelihood of owning equity compared to the likelihood of having a savings 
account. 
 Owning a checking account and using checks is more institutionally intense compared to 
having a savings account.  Not only must an individual be convinced that the bank will 
keep funds safe and available upon demand, but they must also be convinced that the 
payment system as a whole and the system for getting checks from one place to another is 
sufficiently secure to prevent fraud.  At the same time, the threshold of institutional 
quality that is required to support checks is lower than that required to support 
investments in the stock market.  The results bear out this ranking.  In contrast to the 
findings for savings accounts, the impact of institutional quality on having a checking 
account is robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, but improvements in 
institutional quality are more important for stocks than for checks.  A one standard 
deviation increase in institutional quality is associated with an 11 percent increase in 
stock market participation and a 4.7 percent increase in the likelihood of owning checks.  
Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) find that households in high social capital 
areas are more likely to own checks and invest more in the stock market.   
 
We see a similar pattern with a range of investment activities that are intermediated 
through the family: investing in children’s health through prescription drugs, driving to 
work and visiting a doctor.  While investments in children’s health is positively and 
significantly correlated with country of origin institutional quality in the baseline 
specification, the magnitude of the effect of an increase in institutional quality is much 
lower than that for owning stock.   In addition, none of these results are robust to 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.  The fact that institutional quality influences 
the decision to own stock but does not influence other investment decisions, which 
require less institutional support, raises our confidence that our findings are driven by 
individuals who embody home country institutions and not by some spurious correlation 
between country of origin characteristics and immigrant behavior more generally.    
 
The effect of institutional quality on different types of people 
We turn now to examining how institutional quality affects the likelihood that different 
groups of immigrants own stock.  In addition to providing further robustness checks on 
our main results, these estimates help to identify the potential channels through which 
home country institutions come to influence behavior.   
 
Education, occupation, citizenship 
In Table 9, we examine how the impact of institutions varies with education and with 
occupational characteristics.  In columns [2] and [3], we provide estimates for two 
education groups: high education (those with a college degree or more schooling) and 
low education (those who have not completed high school).  The findings are quite 
striking.  Immigrants who have more education are more influenced by home country 
institutions than their counterparts who have completed less schooling.  A one standard 
deviation increase in home country institutional quality is predicted to raise the stock 
market participation of highly educated immigrants by 5.4 percentage points and by 1.0 
percentage points for immigrants in the low education group.
23   
 
                                                 
23 The effect is even larger if we restrict attention to immigrants with advanced degrees. In contrast, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004 and 2005) find that the effect of social 
capital and culture is muted for those with greater education.  This hints at a potentially 
important distinction between how culture and institutions influence behavior.  Educated 
individuals in a country are likely to participate more and to have more direct experience 
with their country’s institutions compared to the less-educated.  At a minimum, they have 
had more direct exposure to educational institutions in their country of origin.
24  I n  
addition, these educational “elites” may belong to a relatively small minority whose 
property is protected by institutions that are more generally less effective.  The effects of 
culture, on the other hand, appear to be more concentrated among less educated 
individuals, suggesting that cultural lessons are transmitted, at least partially, through 
different mechanisms than lessons about the institutional environment. 
 
In columns [4] and [5], we compare the effect of institutional quality on high and low 
skill workers, respectively.
25  One reason for making this comparison is because foreign 
educational credentials are often not accepted by U.S. employers.  This means that a 
highly educated immigrant may be working in a low skill occupation.  It may be the 
occupational milieu rather than education itself that drives the differential impact of 
institutions for high and low education immigrants.  This does not appear to be the case.  
The impact of home country institutions is higher for immigrants with high skill jobs 
compared to those with low skill jobs.  Recall that all of the regressions include controls 
for education.  
 
In column [6], the sample is restricted to immigrants who are naturalized U.S. citizens.  
Among U.S. citizen immigrants, the likelihood of owning stock is significantly increasing 
in home country institutional effectiveness. Restricting the sample in this way has (at 
least) two effects.  First, we make sure that the link between stock market participation 
and home country institutional quality is not driven by the reluctance of undocumented 
immigrants to buy stock and the correlation between being undocumented and coming 
from a country with weak institutions.  Second, immigrants must choose to become 
citizens and by doing so signal their general orientation toward U.S. society and 
institutions.  However, despite this decision, their investment behavior reflects an 
orientation toward country of origin institutions, suggesting that informal institutional 
constraints cannot be shed at will.   
 
Finally in column [7], we eliminate Mexican immigrants from the sample.  Just over a 
quarter of the immigrants were born in Mexico, and we want to make sure that the results 
are not driven by this large number of immigrants who share the same institutional 
background.  Eliminating Mexican immigrants from the sample has no effect on the 
results.   
                                                 
24 Recall that the vast majority of immigrants arrive in the U.S. when they are twenty-one years of age or 
older, after the bulk of their formal education has been completed. 
25 “High Skill Workers” are workers whose 3-digit occupation code from SIPP is mapped into the 
“Professional and Technical” or “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial” categories according to 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) classifications.  “Low Skill Workers” include workers whose 3-digit 
occupation code from SIPP is similarly mapped into “Transportation and Material Moving Occupations”, 
“Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers”, or “Service Occupations, Except Private 
Household” categories according to the same BLS classifications.  
Persistence of Institutions 
We now consider the persistence of the effects of home country institutions.  We address 
this question in columns 2 - 6 of Table 10 which examines the effect of country of origin 
institutional quality on financial market participation in the U.S. for subsets of 
immigrants based on the number of years they have lived in the U.S. 
 
Columns 2 – 6 of Table 10 divide the immigrant sample into five sub-samples based on 
how many years they have been living in the U.S.  For each sub-sample, two estimates 
are produced: one which includes controls for how old the immigrant was when she 
arrived in the U.S. and one which does not.  Controlling for age at arrival in the U.S. 
produces slightly more conservative results, so we discuss those estimates in the text.  
The effects of informal institutional constraints are very persistent.  The effect of 
protection from expropriation is positive and significant for every sub-sample, except for 
the sub-sample of immigrants who have been in the U.S. for more than 28 years. 
 
Learning about Institutions 
We have presented evidence that informal institutional constraints are embodied in 
individuals and that these constraints influence financial market decisions even in a new 
formal institutional framework.  However, these findings do not address the question of 
how or when these constraints become embodied in individuals.  For example, are they 
inherited and present even in individuals who migrated at a very young age?  Or are they 
only observed individuals who migrate as mature adults, consistent with the view that 
they are shaped by an individual’s experience in their country of origin?  We take an 
initial step toward answering these questions via the estimates presented in Table 11.  
This table examines the effect of country of origin institutional quality of financial 
market participation in the U.S. for subsets of immigrants based on their age of arrival in 
the U.S. 
 
Table 11 divides the immigrant sample into three sub-samples based on age at arrival in 
the U.S.: those who arrived before age 16, those who arrived when they were between 16 
and 20 years and those who arrived when they were 21 years or older.  Two estimates are 
produced: one which includes controls for the calendar year when the immigrant arrived 
in the U.S. and one which does not.  Controlling for year of arrival in the U.S. generally 
produces slightly smaller coefficients on institutional quality, so we only discuss the 
findings which include these controls.  Informal institutional constraints from the country 
of origin are present even in very young migrants.  The effect of protection from 
expropriation is positive and statistically significant for all except the youngest migrants.  
The point estimate is somewhat smaller, 0.014 for immigrants who arrived before their 
21
st birthday versus 0.019 for those who arrived after age twenty-one, but this difference 
is not statistically significant. 
 
The effect of country of origin institutions is present even in those who migrated when 
they were 16 to 20 and before many of them would have been likely to have had much 
direct experience with their country of origin institutions outside of school.  They would 
have been unlikely, for example, to have owned stock or had a bank account or to have had direct experience with their country of birth’s legal system.  This suggests that 
families and possibly the educational system, rather than direct experience play an 
important role in shaping an individual’s perception of the trustworthiness of institutions. 
 
Intergenerational Transmission of Informal Institutional Constraints 
In a final set of estimates, we take another approach to examine the robustness of the 
finding that immigrants who come from countries with weak institutions are less likely to 
participate in U.S. financial markets.  Expanding on the findings from Table 11, which 
show that the behavior of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as teenagers is influenced 
by home country institutions, we consider whether institutional attitudes are inherited.  
To do this we take advantage of the fact that the SIPP data provide information on region 
or country of ancestry for individuals born in the U.S.  We can map some of these 
responses to individual countries and then estimate the effect of institutional quality on 
stock market participation for natives as well as for immigrants.
26  The estimates are 
presented in Table 12.   
 
For immigrants, we find a positive and significant effect of institutional quality on stock 
market participation.  For those who were born in the U.S., but trace their ancestry to one 
of the same countries, institutional quality has no effect on financial market participation.  
When the formal institutional environment is altered as profoundly as it is when an 
individual migrates from one country to another, informal institutional constraints do not 
appear to be passed along to future generations.  This contrasts with findings in other 
areas which suggests that some aspects of culture do seem to persist across generations 
and across the same transformation in the formal institutional environment: norms about 
fertility and female labor force participation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005), for example. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper adds to the growing body of theoretical and empirical work that identifies the 
ability of a country’s institutions to protect private property and provide incentives for 
investment as a key explanation for the persistent disparity in financial market 
development across countries.  We investigate the impact of institutional quality on 
financial market development using data on the financial decisions of immigrants in the 
U.S. While all of the individuals whose decisions we analyze face the same formal 
institutional framework in the U.S., they bring with them their impressions and 
experiences with institutions in their home countries.   
 
We find that immigrants from countries with institutions that more effectively protect 
private property and provide incentives for investment are more likely to participate in 
U.S. financial markets.  The effect of home country institutions effects immigrants for at 
least the first 28 years that they live in the U.S. and is present in all but the youngest 
migrants.  The impact of institutions is amplified by living in a neighborhood with many 
                                                 
26 We form samples of natives and of immigrants who map their ancestry to or were born in one of the 
following thirteen countries: Canada, France, the Netherlands, England, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Poland, Russia, Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Republic.   other immigrants from the same country of origin and is greater for immigrants who have 
more education.  These findings are robust to alternative measures of institutional 
effectiveness and to various methods of controlling for unobserved individual 
characteristics, including specifications with country fixed-effects. 
 
The approach that we use allows us to take a glimpse inside the institutional “black box” 
and draw several conclusions.  First, North is right -- individuals “embody” informal 
institutional constraints.  Second, the process by which institutional lessons become 
embedded in individuals occurs early in life, probably in the family and in school, and is 
enhanced by additional formal schooling.  Third, the effect of informal institutional 
constraints is different from other aspects of culture.  It does not appear to decay with 
education, nor is it transmitted across generations when the formal institutional 
environment is altered.   
 
What do these findings tell us about the likely results of formal institutional reform?  
Examining the behavior of immigrants in the U.S. corresponds to a best case scenario for 
institutional reform: the change in the institutional environment is credible, it is multi-
faceted, affecting fiscal, monetary and trade policy as well as the judicial and political 
system; and the individuals whose behavior we study have, in some sense, sought out 
institutional change and are motivated to succeed economically.  Even in this 
environment, informal institutional constraints influence the behavior of international 
migrants in the U.S. for decades.  Translating these findings into a more complex real 
world environment, where institutional reforms are likely to be less comprehensive, 
potentially lack credibility and permanence, and sometimes do not have the full support 
of those they affect, suggests that frequently the impact of institutional reforms will 
unfold over generations.  On a more optimistic note, the legacy of weak institutions does 
not have to persist across generations: when the formal institutional environment is 
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Country Level Variables 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
Protection from Expropriation 
of Private Investment 
 
This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization" of property.  Lower ratings "are given to countries 
where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event."  
Variable is the average over annual country observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data 
Constraints on the Executive  This variable measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the 
power of the chief executive.  The variable takes on seven different 
values: (1) unlimited authority (there are no regular limitations on the 
executive’s actions, as distinct from irregular limitations such as the 
threat or actuality of coups and assassinations); (2) intermediate 
category; (3) slight to moderate limitation (there are some real but 
limited restraints on the executive); (4) intermediate category; (5) 
substantial limitations on executive authority (the executive has more 
effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to 
substantial constraints by them); (6) intermediate category; (7) executive 
parity or subordination (accountability groups have effective authority 
equal or greater than the executive in most areas of activity).  Variable is 
the average over annual country observations 1982 – 1995.  We have 
normalized the variable so it ranges from 1 to 10. 
Source: Polity IV Database:  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/  
Domestic Protection from 
Expropriation of Private 
Investment 
 
This variable is drawn from country level surveys of local entrepreneurs.  
Responses to questions about the impact of theft and crime on the cost 
of business, the ability of state authorities to protect person and property 
and the impact of the predictability of the judiciary on business 
operations were used to create an index for each country.  Respondents 
were asked to rank current conditions (the surveys were conducted 
August 1996 – February 1997) and conditions 10 years ago.  The current 
and historical responses to each of the three questions were averaged 
and then an overall average was formed.   
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Bank World Development 
Report 1997, Private Sector Survey: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wdr97data.html  
Rule of Law  This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are 
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes."  Higher scores indicate:  "sound political 
institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power."  Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending 
on physical force or illegal means to settle claims."  Upon changes in 
government new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of 
the previous regime."  Variable is the average over annual country 
observations 1982 – 1995.  We have normalized the variable so it ranges 
from 1 to 10. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data   
British Legal Origin   This variable is equal to one if the legal regime of the country is British 
and zero otherwise.  Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanez, Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Country Level Variables, continued 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
English Speaking  This variable is equal to one if English is one of the official languages of 
the country and if at least 50% of the immigrants from the country who 
were surveyed in the 1980 U.S. Census report that they do not speak a 
language other than English at home.  
Source: Bleakley, Hoyt and Aimee Chin. “Language Skills and 
Earnings: Evidence from Childhood Immigrants”, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, May 2004. 
Latitude  This variable is equal to the absolute value of the latitude of the 
country’s capital divided by 90.   
Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanez, 
Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp 
Gini Coefficent  Average of Gini-coefficients across one country over all  
“high-quality” observations 1985-95. 
Source: Deininger and Squire (1996) 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm 
Av. Per Capita GDP  Average real GDP per capita 1982 – 1995, 1995 dollars.   
Source:  World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Stock Market Capitalization  Average per capita market capitalization of listed countries, 1982 – 
1995, 1995 dollars.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 
Years of Schooling in 1960  Years of schooling of the total population over 25 in 1960.   
Source: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data on 
Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html  
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim  The percentage of people in the country (x 100) who are a particular 
religion.   
Source:  CIA Factbook. Table 2A: Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native Born in the SIPP Data 
 
Characteristic Native-Born  Immigrant 
Individual Characteristics    
Age 46.47  45.22 
 (17.52)  (16.51) 
% Male  45.6%  46.2% 
% Married  57.4%  65.6% 
% non-white  16.4%  32.2% 
% unemployed or out of the labor force  33.8%  36.7% 
# of children < 18 in household  0.720  1.118 
 (1.090)  (1.347) 
Average monthly per capita household income  $2,224.44  $1,639.53 
 (2,832.45)  (2,375.44) 
Median monthly per capita household  income  $1,578 $1,050 
Average household wealth  $185,754  $122,685 
 (1,398,146)  (978,910) 
25
th percentile of household wealth  $14,660  $3,017 
Median household wealth  $71,123  $29,001 
75
th percentile of household wealth  $186,512  $117,917 
    
Educational Attainment (%)    
Less than High School  15.0%  35.8% 
High School Graduate  30.4%  24.5% 
Some College  30.6%  20.1% 
Bachelor Degree 15.9%  12.5% 
Advanced Degree  8.1%  7.1% 
Financial Market Participation (%)    
% who own stock  20.0%  8.6% 
% with a checking account (interest or non-interest)  63.8%  47.0% 
% with a savings account  54.8%  40.1% 
Other characteristics (%)    
% who drive own car to work  81.7%  75.1% 
% who visited doctor in past 12 months  78.8%  79.3% 
% who purchased prescription drugs for children  51.8%  34.1% 
Number of Individuals  31,046  5,020 
Number of Observations  100,839  15,043 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit 
of observation is a person-wave.  Sample is restricted to the four waves of the Survey on Income and 
Program Participation with wealth information, to individuals 18 and over, to those who live in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area and to those who have non-missing data for “expropriation risk”.   
 Table 2B: Immigrant Characteristics  
 
Characteristic Immigrant 
Year of Arrival in the U.S. (%)    
Before 1964  11.5% 
1965 – 1969  8.2% 
1970 – 1974  10.1% 
1975 – 1979  12.8% 
1980 – 1984  17.9% 
1985 – 1989  18.4% 
1990 – 1996  21.2% 
Age at Migration (%)   
five years or younger  3.7% 
six to ten years   4.6% 
eleven to fifteen years  6.8% 
sixteen to twenty years  14.3% 
over twenty years  70.6% 
Continent of Origin (%)   
North America  46.9% 
Europe  15.4% 
Asia  30.3% 
Africa  0.9% 
South America  6.3% 
Australia and Oceania  0.2% 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit 
of observation is a person-wave.  Sample is restricted to the four waves of the Survey on Income and 
Program Participation with wealth information, to individuals 18 and over, to those who live in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area and to those who have non-missing data for “expropriation risk”.   Table 3A: Summary of Country Variables 
Characteristic N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Median  Max  U.S. 
value 
Measures of Institutional Quality 
Protection  from  Expropriation  79  7.50  1.74 1.81  7.51 10.00 10.00 
Constraints on the Executive  76  6.96  2.87  1.43  7.14  10.00  10.00 
Domestic  Protection  from  Exp.  31  5.31  1.16  3.63 5.12 7.78 5.27 
Rule of Law  79  6.16  2.51  1.94  5.98  10.00  10.00 
British  Legal  Origin    79  0.29  0.46  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Latitude  79  0.33  0.19  0.01 0.33 0.71 0.42 
Av. Years of Schooling, 1960  61  4.27  2.54  0.21  4.06  10.07  8.66 
Other Country Characteristics 
English  Speaking  79  0.139  0.35  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Gini  Coefficent  52  38.80  10.48  22.27 36.24 59.71 41.19 
GDP Per Capita   74  8,704  10,376  106  3,208  42,873  24,831 
Stock Market Cap. Per Capita  65  4,875  8,300  3.38  993  36,406  18,750 
Catholic  74  39.29  40.01 0.00  27.2 97.00 24.00 
Protestant  74  10.43  19.39 0.00  0.35 87.00 52.00 
Muslim  74  16.82  33.77  0.00 0.00  100.00 1.00 
Note: Protection from expropriation, constraints on the executive, quality of the bureaucracy, and rule of 
law have been rescaled so that the maximum possible value is 10.   Table 3B: Correlation between Institutional Quality Measures 







Rule of Law  British Legal 
Origin 
Latitude Average  Years 
of Schooling, 
1960 
Protection  from  Expropriation  ----        
Constraints on the Executive  0.619***  ---       
Domestic Protection from Exp.  0.557***  0.250  ----         
Rule of Law   0.869***  0.501***  0.552***  ----       
British Legal Origin    0.119  0.060  0.021   0.036  ----    
Latitude   0.572***  0.386***  0.348*   0.584***  -0.200*  ---   
Av. Years of Schooling, 1960  0.715***  0.575***  0.201  0.701***  0.023  0.661***  --- 
Notes: *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. Table 4: The Effect of Institutional Quality on Immigrant Stock Market Participation 
    
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Protection from Expropriation  0.016*** 
(0.005) 
      
Constraints on the Executive    0.004* 
(0.002)  
    
Domestic Protection from Expropriation      0.033*** 
(0.009) 
    
Rule of Law        0.012*** 
(0.003) 
   
British  Legal  Origin       0.033** 
(0.017) 
  
Latitude        0.114** 
(0.047)  
Average  Years  of  Schooling,  1960         0.006** 
(0.003) 
         
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315 0.2306 0.2876 0.2314 0.2275 0.2289 0.2296 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 14,052  7,814 14,232 14,232 14,232  7,856 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a 
particular measure of institutional quality is available.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering 
at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   
  
Table 5: The Effect of Institution Quality on Immigrant Stock Market Participation, Additional Country Controls  
 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016 ***  0.014 ***  0.011 **  0.013 **  0.011 *  0.017 ** 
  (0.005)    (0.005)   (0.005)    (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.008)   
Av. Per Capita GDP
†         1.090    1.060    0.766   
         (0.959)   (0.994)   (1.380)   
English  Speaking           0.031  **  0.009   
           (0.010)   (0.023)   
Stock Market Capitalization
†             3.700   
              ( 5 . 0 7 0 )    
Stock Market Capitalization 
Squared
† 
            - 0 . 0 0 0 2  
(0.0001) 
 
Religion  Controls  No   No   Yes   No   No    No   
                 
Continent  Controls  No   Yes   No   No   No    No   
               
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2315   0.2324   0.2341   0.2365   0.2374    0.2375   
Number of Observations  14,232    14,232   13,250   13,336   13,336    11,509   
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a 
particular country characteristic is available.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
country level.  The reported coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 1,000,000.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 6: Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The Effect of Institution Quality on Immigrant Stock Market Participation 
Controlling for Home Country Inequality 
 
 
Explanatory Variable  [1]  [2] 
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.024 ***  0.013 ** 
 (0.006)    (0.006)   
Gini Coefficient      -0.003  *** 
     (0.001)   
        
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2408    0.2435   
Number of Observations  10,206    10,206   
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and 
MSA controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the country level.  The reported coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables 
marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 1,000,000.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** 
indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 7: Does Enforcement Matter? 
Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 











29 countries w/ at 
least 100 obs. 
[3] 
29 countries w/ at 
least 100 obs. 
[4] 
Protection from Expropriation * Ethnic Concentration  0.913***  0.696*  0.928***  0.680* 
  (0.199) (0.369) (0.200) (0.371) 
Ethnic  Concentration  -6.877*** -5.142*  -7.004*** -5.030* 
  (1.501) (2.757) (1.509) (2.766) 
      
Country  Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
      
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2356 0.2599 0.2328 0.2538 
Number  of  Observations  13,867 13,867 13,675 13,675 
Notes:  In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 
5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   39




















Drive own Car to 
Work 
[5] 
 Visited a Doctor 
in Past 12 
Months 
[6] 
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016 ***  0.022 ***  0.024 ***  0.023 ***  -0.003    0.002  
  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.008)    (0.006)   (0.003)   
              
Mean of Dependent Variable  8.6%    40.1%    47.0%    34.1%    75.1%    79.3%   
              
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315   0.1835   0.2386   0.0786   0.0573   0.0035   
Number  of  Observations  14,232    14,232    14,232   3,221   7,546   8,705   
              
B.  Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Protection from Expropriation x 
Ethnic Concentration  0.696 *  -0.282    1.625 ***  1.409 
 
0.892   -0.268  
  (0.369)   (0.598)    (0.496)   (1.059)    (0.658)    (0.492)   
Ethnic  Concentration  -5.142 *  2.533   -12.004 ***  -10.529    -6.702    1.839   
  (2.757)   (4.417)   (3.665)   (7.889)   (4.820)   (3.619)   
Country  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted  R-squared  0.2599   0.1973   0.2492   0.0972   0.0682   0.0017   
Number  of  Observations  13,867    13,867    13,867   3,143   7,340   8,474   
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% 
level, * at at least the 10% level.  “Checking Account” is equal to one if the respondent has a checking account that either does or does not pay interest.  “Savings 
Account” is equal to one if the respondent has a savings account and zero otherwise.  “Prescription Drugs for Children” is asked of respondents who have a child 
aged 0-14 and is equal to one if the respondent purchased prescription drugs for the child, and zero otherwise.  “Drives own Car to Work” is asked of respondents 
who are employed or own a business and is equal to one if the respondent drives to work and is equal to zero otherwise.  “Visited a Doctor in the past 12 months” 
is equal to one if the responded visited a doctor in the 12 months before the survey question and zero otherwise.     40






















Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016*** 0.031***  0.006 0.039***  0.011** 0.025*** 0.016*** 
  (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315 0.2801 0.0890 0.2910 0.1221 0.2427 0.2297 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 2,842 5,127 1,984 2,408 5,829  10,199 
Notes:  In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  High education immigrants are those with a bachelor’s degree or more education.  Low education 
immigrants are those with less than a high school degree.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 
5% level, * at at least the 10% level. “High Skill Workers” are workers whose 3-digit occupation code from SIPP is mapped into “Professional and Technical” or 
“Executive, Administrative, and Managerial” according to Bureau of Labor Statistics classifications.  “Low Skill Workers” include workers whose 3-digit 
occupation code from SIPP is similarly mapped into “Transportation and Material Moving Occupations”, “Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and 
Laborers”, and “Service Occupations, Except Private Household”.    41
 
Table 10: The Persistence of Institutions 
The Effect Institution Quality on Immigrant Stock Market Participation,  
by Years of U.S. Experience 
 
 
Explanatory Variables    Years in the U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 7  8 – 12  13 – 17  18 – 27  28+ 
No Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016***  0.014**  0.013* 0.028*** 0.023***  0.008 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315 0.2138 0.3324 0.3629 0.2660 0.2844 
Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016***  0.014**  0.013 0.028*** 0.022***  0.003 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2331 0.2135 0.3334 0.3631 0.2663 0.2909 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 2,619 2,192 2,145 2,750 2,955 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and 
MSA controls.   A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least 
the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   42
Table 11: Learning about Institutions 
The Effect Institution Quality on Immigrant Stock Market Participation,  
by Age at Migration 
 
 
Explanatory Variables    Age at Arrival in U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 15  16 – 20  21+ 
No Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation  0.016***  0.007  0.013*  0.018*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315 0.2585 0.2715 0.2387 
Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation  0.016***  0.007  0.014*  0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2335 0.2609 0.2721 0.2427 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 1,677 1,639 7,963 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, 
and MSA controls.   A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   43
Table 12: Intergenerational Transmission of Institutional Lessons 
The Effect of Institution Quality on Stock Market Participation 
Selected Natives and Immigrants 
 
Explanatory Variable  Native  Immigrant 
Protection from Expropriation  -0.002  0.021*** 
 (0.019)  (0.008) 
    
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2090  0.2523 
Number of Observations  44,181  7,040 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and 
MSA controls.   A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least 
the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  The native-sample used in these 
estimates includes U.S. born individuals who identified their ancestral country as: Canada, France, the 
Netherlands, England, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Russia, Cuba, Mexico, and the 
Dominican Republic.  The immigrant sample includes foreign-born individuals who were born in these 
same countries.   44
Appendix Table 1: Ethnic Concentration and Number of observations per country 
 
 Country  Median  Ethnic 
Concentration (%) 
Number of Observations 
1 Argentina  0.0747%    96 
2 Australia  0.0580%  30 
3 Austria  0.0633%    64 
4 Bahamas,  The  ---  11 
5 Bangladesh  ---  40 
6 Belgium  0.0314%  21 
7 Bolivia  0.0479%  36 
8 Brazil  0.0965%  55 
9 Canada  0.6848%    392 
10 Chile  0.0717%  77 
11 China  0.8739%  595 
12 Colombia  0.7335%  217 
13 Costa  Rica  ---  34 
14 Cuba  17.3184%  617 
15 Czechoslovakia
27 0.1673%  38 
16 Denmark  0.0704%  7 
17 Dominican  Republic  1.5686%  267 
18 Ecuador  0.6477%  172 
19 Egypt  0.1477%  38 
20 El  Salvador  1.0890%  494 
21 England
28   0.5252%  419 
22 Ethiopia  0.0815%  5 
23 Finland  0.0145%  3 
24 France  0.1185%  88 
25  Germany (East and West)  0.4858%  373 
26 Ghana  ---  16 
27 Greece  0.3521%  124 
28 Guatemala  0.1697%  158 
29 Guyana  0.5743%  134 
30 Haiti  0.6296%  219 
31 Honduras  0.1611%  143 
32 Hong  Kong  0.1917%  139 
33 Hungary  0.1195%  72 
34 India  0.3301%  417 
35 Indonesia  0.1241%  1 
36 Iran  0.0987%  145 
37 Iraq  0.1540%  53 
38 Ireland  0.1394%  136 
39 Israel  0.1350%  53 
40 Italy  0.5840%  290 
41 Jamaica  1.0060%  318 
42 Japan  0.3189%  182 
43 Jordan  0.0270%  16 
44 Kenya  ---  7 
45 Korea,  South  0.5308%  438 
46 Lebanon  0.0330%  52 
                                                 
27 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, Czech Republic. 
28 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: England, United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland.   45
47 Malaysia  0.0232%  19 
48 Mexico  8.5920%  4,163   46
 
Appendix Table 1: Ethnic Concentration and Number of observations per country, 
continued 
 
 Country  Median  Ethnic 
Concentration (%) 
Number of Observations 
49 Morocco  ---  6 
50 Myanmar  ---  23 
51 Netherlands  0.1492%  46 
52 New  Zealand  0.0027%  3 
53 Nicaragua  0.3377%  81 
54 Nigeria  0.0562%  39 
55 Norway  0.0386%  19 
56 Pakistan  0.0764%  84 
57 Panama  0.0652%  26 
58 Peru  0.2147%  108 
59 Philippines  1.8140%  916 
60 Poland  0.7874%  249 
61 Portugal  0.3592%  88 
62 Romania  0.0873%  52 
63 Russia
29 0.4919%  365 
64 Singapore  0.0130%  3 
65 South  Africa  0.0297%  24 
66 Spain  0.1249%  66 
67 Sweden  0.0388%  29 
68 Switzerland  0.0464%  16 
69 Syria  0.0511%  42 
70 Taiwan  0.2270%  216 
71 Thailand  0.0547%  79 
72 Trinidad  &  Tobago  0.4149%  131 
73 Turkey  0.0555%  15 
74 Uruguay  0.0644%  7 
75 Venezuela  0.3400%  46 
76 Vietnam  0.7256%  663 
77 Yugoslavia
30 0.1243%  117 
 All  0.7829%  15,043 
 
                                                 
29 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Russia, Armenia, Azerbijan, the Baltic States, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, USSR, Uzebekistan. 
30 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Serbia.   47
Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Control Variables on Stock Market Participation 
 
Explanatory Variable  [1] 
 
Age
† 0.215   
 (0.157)   
Age Squared
† -0.002   
 (0.002)   
2
nd Wealth Quartile  0.010  * 
 (0.005)   
3
rd Wealth Quartile  0.040  *** 
 (0.012)   
4
th Wealth Quartile  0.179  *** 
 (0.020)   
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  0.027  *** 
 (0.008)   
Per Capita Income
†† 30.700  *** 
 (4.590)   
Per Capita Income Squared
†† -0.001  *** 
 (0.000)   
Male   -0.021  *** 
 (0.005)   
Married 0.024  ** 
 (0.010)   
Number of Children  -0.004  * 
 (0.002)   
Non-white 0.003   
 (0.012)   
High School Graduate  -0.0001   
 (0.007)   
Some College  0.043  *** 
 (0.011)   
Bachelor Degree  0.050  *** 
 (0.018)   
Advance Degree  0.161  *** 
 (0.024)   
Protection from Expropriation  0.016  *** 
 (0.005)   
Constant   -0.201  *** 
 (0.052)   
MSA Controls  Yes   
    
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2315   
Number of Observations  14,232   
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent owned stock during the interview period in 
question and is zero otherwise.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported 
coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 
100, by a †† are multiplied by 1,000,000.  The lowest wealth quartile is the omitted wealth category, and 
the omitted education category is less than high school graduate.  *** indicates significance at at least the 
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